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The standard use of !.he word 'cu!Lure' is to refer globally to whatever is
opposed to nature, whatever is a malLer of learned behaviour as opposed to
whatcvcr is built into our psychology and physiology. But !.he next thing to say
is !.hat naturc is culture and culture is nature: that is, what is most deeply a part
of human nature is that human beings live culturally, in Iearncd ways of life
mediated by locally developed languages and symbol systems, so that our
culture is natural to us while our nature is accessible to us only in ways
mediated by our culture. Despite that, however, the polarity of nature and
cu!Lure is a fact of our experience and a fact of ideology. Structuralists
especially. and their successors in the tradition of Saussurcan linguistic
analysis. succumb to the nightmare that reality in today's information-satu-
rated age is not mediated by culture but has quite disappeared. so !.hat our world
is entirely one of simulation and illusion.· But to think like !.hat is to be
inattcntive to the actual weight and quality of one's life as one lives it minute
by minute, and to the roughness and sheen of !.he earth. We cat actual food,
sleep on solid beds, open tangible doors on streets where winds really blow in
our own faces.
In addition to the global contrast between !.he natural and cu!Lural aspects
or tendencies in human life, the word 'cu!Lure' is used with the indefinite
article. 'a cuhure,' to refer to the specific way of life shared by some more or
less clearly differentiated group. and distinguishable as a totality from o!.her
ways of life pertaining to other such groups. Every human being belongs to
someculturc or cultures and fails to belong to others, and this isso whether one
renects on the matter or n01.2
There is a third thing we sometimes mean by the word culture: the culture
of a group may be identified with that part of its way of life of which it is
conscious as distinctive, as what 'we' do.
Then !.here is a fourth thing: that part of 'culture' in the !.hird sense !.hat is
consciously cultivated and used to maintain a group's sense of its identity. It
is this sense of !.he word that is evoked by the word 'multiculturalism', a
phenomenon whereby parts of a political unit arc encouraged to foster certain
distinctive traits that may serve to maintain a sense of difference from !.he
surrounding hordes. This is actually contrasted with the third sense of !.he term,
because by equatingcuhural identity with a handful of traits and traditions one
• This paper was developed from a lecture first given in Canada.
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as it were ncutralizcs thc divisivc tcndcncy to think of oneself as allOgether a
special sort of person whose whole life is self-consciously distinctive.
The fifth sense of 'culturc' is the kind that makes one a 'culLured' or
'cultivated' person, and is tied in to an educational system: within the way of
life of a group as a whole, certain skills and habits arc specially fostered and
esteemed and arc inculcated by official institutions of training. This kind of
culture is supposed to require effort to attain and is supposed to repay that
effort: it<; attainment represents a publicly acknowledged ideal. It is what the
Canada Council and similar bodies stand for; I don't think you can have it
without an educational systcm and I don't think you can have an educational
system without it.
In impcrial or metropolitan civilizations, in which the official educational
system is supcrimposcd on local ways of life with which it may have no
discernible rclation, thc fifth scnse of 'culLure' passes over into what is really
a sixth: high culLurc is now contra<;ted with what is provincial or ethnic, not
simply as education versus lack ofeducation, but as civilization versus lack of
civilization.JEthnicdances may be as hard to learn, may bcobjccts ofas refined
a discrimination, a<; ballct; but they don't count, because the people who go in
for them are, by definition, not the best people.·
Scventhly and lastly, of course, thcre is the dcrelativized equivalent of the
sixth, Culture with a capital C, the absolute pcrfection of mankind. The idea
behind this is that all educational systems in the end converge at the top: that
just as mathematics is evcrywhere mathcmatics, and physics is idcally just
physics, so whcn all local distortions arc purgcd away Art will be simply Art,
polite society will be everywhere the same, sharing everywhere the same tastes
because the human physiology and psychology are themsel ves evcrywhcre the
same, so that in thc end a single world civilization will sustain a single
educational system and a single world-wide art. This conviction is implicit in
the very idea of ·cnlightenmcnt'. It is thought naive to belicve in it nowadays,
as well as pernicious, because it is felt to be a mere cover for the imperialism
idcntificd in the preceding paragraph. But much of what goes on in the world
makes sense only if somcthing like it is true.
Those arc the scven mcanings of the word culLure, corresponding to seven
aspects of the ways human valucs are organized. The rest of what I am going
to say will have to do with all seven of them, but not directly. To think about
culture is to think either about anthropology or about the ideology ofeducation,
and that is not quite the emphasis I want to bring out.
Here, then, is where the story really begins. The first thing I have to say is
that it is crazy, really deeply Cr..lzy, for someone to travel thousands of miles
to talk about art and cultureor values today. Except for acouple ofhours around
midnight, when most of us arc asleep inourbedsanyway, today is the same day
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in Alberta and in Ontario, so no need to talk aboutthal. What about culture and
values? Our culture is what we live, our values arc what we live by. Either they
are the same for me as for you, or they arc different. If they arc different, why
doyou want to know about mine when you have your own? If they are the same,
you do not need to be told about them-you know as much about them as I do.
Our values arc what we live by; they arc our lives; they arc not something we
need information about. We grow into them, we learn them from those from
whom we learn how to live. If we who have reached years of discretion need
to be reminded of them, it is by way of exhortation, not of instruction or
explanation; and if you arc not already commilled to the true, the beautiful, the
good, the holy, the far out, or whatever, you are not likely to undertake such
commiunent at my urging. The only excuse would be if I were talking about
cultures five through seven, the culture with its associated values as tied in to
the educational machinery. Since I have come from one university to another,
perhaps lhal's il: we arc lo compare professional nOles. BUl is my educational
system the same as yours? Apparently not, since education in this country
[Canada) is a provincial responsibility. But perhaps that means that we all
officially believe in culture seven, the ideal on which all systems converge.
Each province manages its own education only in the same spirit that each
family might grow its own potatoes in its own back yard-the potatoes arc
exactly the same, we just gel the satisfaction of digging our own. If so, my
presence is like that of a neighbour leaning over your back fence and asking
how your potatocs arc coming. But can anyone nowadays really believe in
culture seven? Well, we'd beller believe it, since our whole university system
is buill on it.
That disposes of today, and values, and culture lOO for that maller. What's
left of my topic is art. Docs it make any beller sense for me to talk about art?
Old values in old art arc an old story, so there arc three possibilities. Icould tell
you about new values in old art, or I could tell you about old values in new art,
or I could tell you about new values in new art. But can you learn about any of
that from a stranger? Surely not. I don't know what art is, but I am convinced
that it is something the value of which is released only in direct experience. A
picture, for instance, can have no artistic value that is not released in the seeing
of it, or that does not depend on a value so released. If a picture moves you to
love God or to overthrow the government, ilS doing so is related lO its being a
work ofart only ifit is lheeffeclofsome value you find in lookingatlhe picture
itself. Otherwise, the picture is a mere causal stimulus or a piece of evidence.
So only two kinds of people can usefully tell you about what is new in art and
culture: people who know you well enough to share your values and visions,
and enthusiasL'> who can sell you on what is new in this or that art. Why should
a professor of philosophy be a person ofeither of those kinds? Should I tell you
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that what you need is not me but a friend or a salesman? Well, if so, I have told
you.
Whatever I say, I can hardly be talking about your art and your values; and
I am here 10 tell you that there really is something crazy, if you SlOp to think
about it, in being concerned with art and values that arc other than your own.
So what good reason can you good people have for being here? Curiosity,
perhaps-something really irrelevant always makes a nice change. And then,
when a speaker picks on a broad-sounding topic, there is the interest of
discovering what will be put in and what will be left out, what will come first
and what will be left till last, and what will come in between. So now you know
what I will have said first.
Here is what I have to say next. Some years ago, two good old-fashioned
professors. Bertram Jessup and Melvin Rader, published a book called Art and
lIuman Values. 5 There theme was lhat art, taken as a whole, expresses all
human values. If love is something thaI mailers 10 people, there will be art lhal
analomizes and celebrates love; if lhere are people for whom pure politics is
an original passion, the pa<;sion of polilics will find expression in art; and so
on. So an anatomy of values will be one sortofanaLOmy ofart-and vice versa
too, I suppose, if one could be as sure about what counts as art as one may be
as what counts as a value. And I suppose that one sort of value would be the
value of arl itself, and thaI arl expressing or celebraling thaI value would be at
best a pure expression of celebration or celebration of expression.
The trouble wilh pUlling things thaI way, I mean talking about anatomies
of art or of values, is that it makes it sound as if one could divide one's values
up into neat packages, rei igion, love, scI f-estccm, heallh, wealth and so on. But
thaI is a very external way of treating something that in relaLion Lo our lives is
not external aL all. When we speak of values whaL we mean is all the things we
want in life, all our rea<;ons and motives for doing what we do. And whatever
we do is done from a motive or for a reason, usually something specific to the
occasion and always something very complicated, because whatever we do
shows what we most want to do and thus involves direcLly or indirecLly the
whole shape of our lives at Lhat moment.6 Everything we do has a value, and
its value has three dimensions: the worth that action has in itself. what it
contributes to further ends, and how it relaLes to other possible actions and lheir
values.7 Our values, that is, are not less complex lhan our lives, and nOlless
subLly ordered, so that whal we can convey about them by anatomizing them
into gross categories like 'religion' or 'scx' is very lillie-is perhaps less than
nothing, because what it contribules 10 the description ofour lives may be less
than il docs in falsifying what it is like to be a living person.
Well then, ifJessup and Rader were right when they said that art expresscs
all human values, and human values are not less than the whole oflife,then the
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scope of art is not less than everything. If my intention in coming here was to
furnish an anatomy, a way of describing art and values so that you could get
a hold on them in your minds, talking about 'art and alienation' or 'art and
revolution,' it would be like trying to shut you up in a set of boxes. In fact, the
word 'culture' in its second sense, whereby we talk about a culture as the
totality of the way of living learned within a society, is often supposed to carry
within ilSClf the implication that a culture is essentially indivisible, so thal a
culture cannot be properly described bUl only lived, nol for the trivial reason
lhat no description of anything can say everything about what it describes, but
because the very project ofdescription violates the kind of reality that a culture
ha<;.
But what is this 'art', of which our venerable authors could say that it
celebrated or expressed everything that could be expressed or celebrated? In
a way, we know. It is the sort of thing we find in art galleries, and we soon learn
what that is. And we soon notice that people who talk about the nature and
function of art include anything in the way of music, or literature, or archilec-
ture, or fi 1m, that geLS treated in the same sort of way, or is assigned the same
sort of human significance, as what we find in art galleries. BUl what counts as
relevant likeness here? Whal about clothes, for instance? Is a Chinese emper-
or's silken robe a work of art?8 If so, what about a motor-cyclist's silver-
studded black jacket, which certainly e;r;presses values in a very direct and
eloquent way? But then, which jacket of which cyclisl? Who decides what
belongs in what sonofmuseum? Ifa wino squats in a doorway and drinks from
a bollle swathed to iL<; neck in a brown paper bag, the bag and the act of
wrapping express the wino's values; and injust what son of gallery would they
be at home? That sounds like a frivolous question, but really it isn't at all: a
responsible answer calls on the resources of sociology, political philosophy,
art history and the psychology of perception, lO name a few disciplines almost
al mndom, and so far no one has found an answer to it that is convincingly better
than every other answer. And suppose you did decide thal a wino's paper bag
was a work of art and belonged in some gallery or othcr, you would still have
to figure out which wino, and which of his bags, to choose. And then you might
prefer to leave all the hikers on their bikes and the winos in their doorways and
declare the whole world to be a museum and everything in it to be art 'We are
blessed by everything', said Yeats, 'everything we look upon is blest'.9 The
medieval scholastics argued that everything that existed had some beauty, and
Schopenhauer agrecd with them, and surely when St Thomas Aquinas agrees
with Schopenhauer it is not for the likes of us lO gainsay them. 1O
However, if everything people do expresses their values, and art expresses
all human values, it does not follow lhat whalever expresses values is art The
net of art may be narrowly or widely drawn, with meshes of different sizes. It
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is not merely that different people have different ideas about what counts as art
and what does not; what is more important is that each of us, on different
occasions and for different purposes, wants to exclude and include different
things in the same category as what is for us most indubitably art. Things get
confusing because smart people keep confronting us with objects that they say
we must accept as art because in some obviously relevant respect they are just
like the things we already accept, though we may fecI that art would not be
worth bothering with ifweeither had to reject the latter or acceptthe former. 1I
Don't let those smart people bother you. Really all we necd say in reply is that
we are not fishing with that net today, thank you.
I do not know how many useful ways there are of specifying what art iS,any
one of which may be just what we need on some occa<;ion. Here arc seven to
be going on with-seven nelS, each probably catching fewer fish than the one
before it.
First, we can say that whatever expresses values is art, but since whatever
enters our lives has some meaning and hence some value, that means we will
be saying that everything is art, or that anything anyone calls art is art, or that
any product of human activity that anyone thinks ofas art is art. Everything is
potcntially meaningful, and wherever meaningfulness is found and pro-
claimed, there actually is art. People do say such things. I've heard them.
Second, we can equate art with the aesthetic. Much of our lives is a matter
of bleak necessity; whatever gocs beyond that, whatever in our lives is
claborated and attended to for ilS own sake, is to that extent playful and free,
and therefore belongs to the realm of art. When we cat, it is vcry seldom thal
we merely grab a handful ofberries from a bush: wc have meals, sitting at table,
at wh ich food is cooked and prepared and served in an establ ished order, in cups
and on plates which arc very often all of the same design. Not every meal is a
formal banquet; but even the most casual snack partakes to some extent in the
ritual of the table that forms partofthe fabric ofcivilized life. In this sortofway,
some people maintain, practically the whole of life is patterned and converted
into art. (Art in this sense comes close to 'culturc' in the third sense of the term,
but isn't quite thaL; it equates art with the aesthetic, not with what contributes
to ethnic solidarity.)
Third, we can say that that pervasive transformation ofour necessities into
culture and ritual, real and important though it may be, is not necessarily art.
It isn't art unless it's something we wouldn't do at all if it were not for ilS
expressive value or for simple delight in ilS beauty. Art is gratuitous ornament
and adornment. Art in that sense is not necessarily a good thing; it includes a
lot of gratuitous messing things up, a lot that in other moods we might contrast
with art as kitsch, expressing nothing beyond the will to make a fuss or an
empty homage to the idea of art itself.
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A fourth view equates art not with embellishment at large. but with the fine
arts-painting, sculpture, literature, architecture, music, dance. theatre. and
perhaps a few more. These are forms of organized enhancement of life that go
beyond decoration and involve the systematic cultivation of means ofexpres-
sion in a publicly recognized institutional context. Art is now the arts, which
professionals practice for their public and we ourselves may pursue for
ourselves and each other in an amateur way. These are things that we lcam
about at school, a<; part ofour liberal education, and some of which our schools
may actually teach us todo. This brings us into the domain ofculture in the fifth
sense. But art as thus understood includes every proper employment of the
skills and media in question, and thus embraces much that is trivial, mere
amusement and entertainment, and no doubt much that to a serious person must
seem debased and corrupt.
A fifth view of art renects that art is a serious business. If art expresses
values, nothing can possibly be more serious than values (for seriousness is a
measure of the value of values). In this fmmeofmind we will want to say that
only part of the embellishment of life, or of the practices of the fine arts, that
goes beyond decoration and entertainment and is rcally in earnest is worthy of
the name ofart. What we put into our art museums and ontoour postage stamps,
what we find worth mentioning in a history ofart, is what repays attention, what
is worth working at, what we are the better for; and nothing less than that should
be called art. Here we arc rather in the domain of culture in the sixth sense, but
the fit is not at all exact.
A sixth view of art goes further still. What is serious and precious may
include much that is academic and routine, worthy in its way but making little
real difference to anything. But there is a kind of seriousness that goes beyond
what our institutions have recognized. There is a pure spirit ofart, we now say,
that goes beyond and against the academics and galleries. Only that which
expresses what was never expressed before and brings new values to the point
of recognition is truly expressive of values and not merely an anecdotal
repetition of that which was expressed long ago. Art is what makes history,
contributes to the development of humanity, a high art that prophesies against
all establishments in the name of what was never before perceived or felt. The
only true art is what stands at the thrusting point, the cutting edge, of what in
our weaker and slacker movements we allow to usurp the name.12 And here we
are on the territory of culture in the seventh sense, because if and only if there
can be such a culture do we have the right to postulate such a status for any art.
Finally a seventh view of art carries on the impetus of the sixth. If
established values are not real values but only the corpses of past values, the
value of art iLC;Clf is dead value. The true art is then the renunciation of art; the
true artist will renounce art foran ironic anti-art, or will simply give upand play
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chess or smuggle rifles. By the same lOken, the seventh sense of culture is the
very antithesis ofculture in the second sense, of the actual ways oflife in which
all values are roolCd. And this seventh way ofdrawing the boundaries ofart has
to be the end of the line, for if the only true art is the rejection of art. I suppose
it follows that the only UlIe art is the rejection of the rejection of art, so that if
we want to make sense when we think and talk about art we would do better
to setL1e for something more modest, and may do so with a good conscience.
And in fact, most of the time when most of us are talking and thinking about
art we arc doing so somewhere in the middle of the range of views I have laid
before you, according 10 which not everything is art but quite a lot is.
Art, say Jessup and Rader, expresses and celebrates all human values. But
just how is art related to values, or to culture? Obviously one cannot say if an
and culture can mean so many different things. If people say they are going to
talk about the relation between art and culture or value, we have to wait and
hear what they say before we know what relationship between what and what
else they have in mind. This is one of my main themes, so it will not be out of
place for me tocomplicale things even more. Here are half a dozen things that
someone who promised to Ullk about art and values might tum out 10 be talking
about, and there must be lots more.
First, if we take art in something like the fourth sense, so that art coincides
with the professional pmctice of the fine arts including the entertainment
industries, it is obvious thal art in general will respond to and reflect the values
of society at large: what is done will show what there is a demand for and what
there is a compulsion to do. A country's TV programming, for instance,
reflects a system of choices that has its own significance, and the fact that it is
this system of choices that has prevailed has another kind of significance.
Second, art conceived in the same sort of way may form a totality that
articulates the mythology which constitutes the world in which its society
imaginatively lives. We think now not of the actual system of choices and
preferences, ofhopcs and fears, that is reflected in what is done and left undone,
but the imaginative world-order, the structures of thought revealed in what is
done, in the sorts of ways explored by such men as Northrop Frye and Claude
Levi-Strauss.
Third, one can argue that art a<; the expression of values must celebrate and
reinforce those values, and the values it predominanL1y expresses must be the
dominant ones, which must of course be the values of the dominant class, so
that art will be a reactionary or revolutionary political instrument unless an
artist can contrive to prevent it being so. Such a view may be described as
'marxist', but it is hardly disputable if the phrase 'dominant class' has any
application. The system of choices that prevails in a society prevails because
there is power behind it-that, after all, is what power is; and the factthal as
51
The Sydney Society ofLiterature and Aesthetics
expression and celebration art has the air of freedom must bestow an unwar-
ranted impression of legitimacy on whatever it expresses and celebrates.
Fourth, if we confine art to what is serious, which was the fifth use of the
tenn that we mcntioned, we will say that art reflects not the values we happen
to have or those thatgo with political power, but the values we esteem ourselves
for having. We effect this restriction in two ways. On the one hand, we might
first decide what art was serious, and then look to see what values it enshrined;
on the other hand, we might start by deciding what valucs are to be prefcrred,
and thcn confinc the name of art to what suitably expressed those preferrcd
values.
Fifth, if we insist that art is really serious and we call nothing art unless it
demands close attention, wc may say that art does not celebrate values at all,
for celebration should not be hard work. Nor can it merely reflect values, for
reflection requires no effort. Art will call for attention because it goes against
the grain, is difficuIt and harsh. And then wemay say,asT. W. Adomodid,that
the value in art is that, in being austere and true to its self.imposed tasks of
creation and discovery, it offers almost the only rcfuge for a free mind in
t<xiay's managed and manipulated socicties.1J
Sixth and last, if we confinc art to the thrusting point and cutting edge of
the consciousness of historical humanity, we may say that art as such does not
merely ignore prevailing values in favour of its own but is a destroyer of
established values, that the true voice of art is the voice of rejection: that art
when it is most itself expresses what Morse Peckham called 'man's rage for
chaos' .14
All these six things we can say, and argue for, while still clinging to thc
thesis that art as such expresses all human values. It is just a question of how
those values are to be expressed, and what sort of art will express them, and
when.
But there is yet another complication I want to bring to your attention.
When we say that art expresses and celebrates values it sounds straightforward
enough. Painters express their admiration of a person's beauty by doing a
picture in which that person's beauty is displayed and thus celebrated;
novelists express thcir loathing for bourgeois hypocrisy by telling a story in
which that hypocrisy is glecfully laid bare and thus celebrated. But a sociolo·
gist who was studying the audience for pop groups in a British city some years
ago found that there were three different ways in which such a group and its
fans might be related. Sometimcs the relation was simple: people who
preferrcd a particular style of music might simply be united by their actual
liking for it, and perhaps observably sharing certain economic and social
characteristics. Butsometimes the music and its associated life-style shared the
same general character. And in other cases again the relation was closer and
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more functional: the use of the music actually entered into and supported the
chosen way of life. These three observed relationships correspond roughly to
the second, third, and fourth senses of the word 'culture' that I picked out
above. The present point is that when people say that art expresses values it
isn't usually clear that they had anyone of these relationships in mind rather
than some two or them or all three or, indeed, something else entirely.15
Why am I making all these distinctions and enumerating all these possibili-
ties? Chieny because a few years ago one was constantly reading in the
newspapers that the distortions and harshnesses of modem art express the
alienation of modem humanity or the sickness of the modem age, or something
equal1y pervasive and depressing. Such pronouncements sound reasonable
enough until you ask what they mean; after all, distortion and anxiety do seem
to belong together somehow. But when we have before our minds a whole heap
of alternatives, as you and I do now, we see at once that such statements do not
mean anything in particular. It is most unlikely that the authors of such
statements have asked themselves the appropriate questions, or, if they had,
knew what answer they would give, much less what reasons they might have
for asserting that the particular relationship they had in mind was the one that
really obtained, mther than one of the many other possibilities. I suspect that
even Rader and Jessup, when they said that art expresses all human values,
meant nothing more definite than that art is not something that exists in a
compartment al1 its own, cut off from the major concerns of life. I expect they
would have said that al1 sorts ofart are related to all sorts ofconcerns in al1 sorts
of ways, and the more ways you can think of, the more of the truth you will
have.
Almost everything I have said so far has been about art and culture and
values at any time and place. What about today? Well, the main thing about
today is that it is much like any other day. Despite all transformations of the
means and relations of production, and despite the communications revolu-
tion, human beings continue to be born, grow up, grow old, sicken, and die, and
meanwhile eat and drink and procreate, as they always have. The languages
that frame their thoughts have had the same sort of structure throughout
recorded history; the list of passions that move us has had few additions or
deletions in all that time; there are few really new virtues or sins. If that is so,
the largest and most important part of art will not have changed much either,
even if it never gets into the papers. The papers never report the important
things,like the fact that on any given day the majority of the billions of people
who were breathing at dawn are still breathing at nightfall.
If everything done on the day I write this, or on the day you hear it, were
to be deleted from the storehouse and memory of the world, it would make no
perceptible difference. Not only is no one day's art essential, no one day's art
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is even noticeable.
No use talking about today, then. Let us narrow down more slowly. The
first restriction we could make on the universality of our discourse would be
to western civilization as a whole: the civilization that acknowledges the
ancestry of Greek thought and Israelite piety. Are there any values distinctive
of that civilization a such? If there are, they are surely so pervasive that we are
not aware of them. As Marshall McLuhan so memorably said, 'We don't know
who discovered water, but we do know it wa<;n't a fish'. We would have to
conjccture what they might be from our sense of how other civilizations seem
todiffer from it; and that sense itsclfwould be an expression ofour unconscious
predispositions.
I did once hear an eminent anthropologist venture an answer 10 this
apparenl1y unanswerable question of what is distinctive in the values of our
civilization as a whole. 16 He had been investigating, among other things, the
'cargo cults' of certain Pacific islands, a curiously dislocated religious phe-
nomenon that was not rooted in the native cultures of those who practised it but
represented a reaction to the impact of Western tcchnology and missionary
activity. The message that missionaries chieny convey, he renccted, is not the
gospel they preach but the whole way of life they exemplify. And he reached
the conclusion that what missionaries, tmders, and all such Western emissaries
to remote parl" of the world represent, that is distinctiveand al ien to the cultures
they invade, the distinctive value of our civilization, is individuality. Not
individualism, but individuality, a notion in three parts: uniqueness, the idea
that every person is unlike any other and is to be esteemed and respected for
himself or herself alone; morality, the idea that people are to be guided not by
the folkways but by their own convictions of right and wrong; and responsibil-
ity, the idea that these unique and moral individuals are not independent ofeach
other but must have a caring regard for the standards, the traditions, and the
interests of the society in which they liveand towhich they belong. This sounds
to me like a description of the individual as defined by Hegel, but the
anthropologist did nOllook to me like someone who would have been reading
Hegel lately, and he claimed the authority not of philosophy but of social
science. This set of ideas, he said, is ubiquitous in western civilization and is
found nowhere else. And what is most distinctive in it is the individual's
readiness to enter into and return from anomie, the separation of oneself from
all sociallimiLS, a separation and return which in other civilizations is limited
to special social positions like that of the shaman, but in our civilization is
essential to the individual being of each of us.
My special reason for singling out the anthropologist's claim is that one
could well argue that the practice of serious art as such (that is, as carried on
under the concept of art) is unique to our society and expresses and celebrates
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just this value of individuality. If you were to set out on a serious career as an
artist I think it would be just these three demands of uniqueness, of morality,
and of responsibility, that impinged on you, from yourself, from your critics,
and from your professional cOlleagues-that is, from all those who took what
you were doing seriously for its own sake. If that is true, then one thing to say
about art and values today is that it is in serious art that the predominant value
set of our common culture is explicitly recognized as supreme, whereas
everywhere else it is only tacitly manifested and is even more often compro-
mised than it is in the arts.
Narrowing down from western civilization, our next approximation to
'today' is the day of the industrial revolution, the day of the jobholder, the day
when labour is divided almost to the point of pulverization. In this age the
characteristic condition is said to be that of alienation, the loss of any sense of
control over the determinanL'> of our existence. Our lives are shaped and
packaged by big government, big business, or simply the interconnectedness
of a complex economy, and the human rhythms of our lives are violated by
bureaucratization and mechanization. Now, I do not know at all how many
people's experience of themselves and their own lives is predominantly one of
alienation and self-loss. I don 'tthink mine is, but I may be exceptionally lucky,
for two reasons. First, I was sent at an early age to a boarding school where I
picked up very young the trick of living a private life in the interstices of
institutions (like a mammal among the feet of dinosaurs), so that I grew up
deceitful and embillered but not alienated; and, second, university professors
have immensely more control over the rhythms of the working lives they live
in their ivory termiteries than almost any other kind of wage slave. Still, many
people are quite sure this is an age of alienation, so it cannot be out of place to
ask what comes ofart and values in such an age. I will just mention three views.
They are not rivals, but complementary, dealing with different aspects of the
situation as they see it.
First comes T. W. Adorno, whose views I already mentioned as the fifth of
our six ways of relating art to values. In the present context his view comes to
this, that if art is the activity in which the western value of individuality is
especially celebrated it will preserve that value against the manipulations of
social forces when all else fails. It is quite true, Adorno admits, that in the long
run art, like everything else in the superstructure of the human world, reflects
the means and relations of production, but the relation is by no means direct.
For all practical purposes of artist and public, the situation for art at any given
time is determined almost entirely by the problems posed by the most recent
art, just as a chess-player's move responds to the situation of the game as the
opponent's last move has left it. 17 An then represents a strict but self-chosen
necessity, submission to which is not alienation because it is our own frec
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choice first to enter the world ofart and then at every point to make its problems
our own. In fact, we invent its necessity by construing the history ofart in such
a way that only one direction for legitimate progress remains open; but that
invention in tum is neither free nor alienated, because it follows directly from
our will to take art seriously as imposing its own demands. In 1795, when the
industrial revolution was only acloud on the German horizon, the poet Schiller
had declared that the world of art, in which the only necessity was that of the
imagination, was the true domain of human freedom, and hence the only place
where humanity wa<; truly human.II What Adorno is arguing is that as our
condition becomes ever more alienated we can preserve our humanity by
making the necessities of the imagination ever more strict. Of course, art can
have this value only if you take it more seriously than most of us want to. But
then, desperate situations call for desperate remedies.
On Adorno's theory, only a harsh and difficult art will serve us in an age
of alienation. Other thinkers, such as the Hungarian sociologist Ivan Viillnyi,
point out that such an art is not the only art we need: 9 If it is really true that
alienation prevails in our society, the conditions of life must be such that few
people are in any position to pursue the intricacies of high art. Such a society
needs what it actually has, two different kinds of art: a high art that demands
and repays close attention, and a low-pressure, undemanding art thal will
amuse and a<;suage, that will speak to everyday concerns, and that can
accompany our distracted lives, affirming the basic humanity and community
on which polarizations and bureaucratizations and other al ienating factors are
superimposed. Some people writeas if these two kindsofart were rivalsofeach
other, but they are not. Both are necessary, they have different functions and
different qualities. To some extent, they have different publics, but not
altogether so, since they meet different occasions and different needs and there
is no rea<;on why such occasions and needs should not occur within the
compass ofa single life. So it is equally foolish to decry the one as elitist or the
other as mere entertainment.
Betwecn the positions of Viuinyi and Adorno is that of the Polish-
Cal i fom ian aesthetic ian Stefan Morawski.20 Like Adorno, hecontrasts real art,
which demands serious attention, with mere entertainment, but, unlike him, he
thinks that different forms of serious art can have different positive values in
the lives of people whose experience of themselves is predominantly one of
alienation and self-loss.
There are three kinds of art, he says, that speak to our condition and do
something to heal it, in relation to the past, the present, and the future
respectively. He calls them Orphic, Philoctetean, and Promethean. Orphic art
is the art of harmony and inward order, which by its example of integrity
sustains our own inner control and sense of balance. Philoctetean art relates us
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healingly to our past, reaching within us the sources of the emotional unity we
fecI we have lost. And the forward-looking Promethean an inspires and
invigorates us with the promise of unity restored. Orphic an includes most
abstract an, an ofstrong design; Phi loctetean an is an ofexpressive power and
depth; and Promethean an, I suppose, would be an that relates imagination to
the will. But what Vitilllyi thinks ofasan for every day Morawski,likeAdomo,
thinks ofas a parody ofan, not offering healing but flattering with false comfort
or facile cynicism; and beyond that again is the world of advertising and
propaganda, which uses what should have been the resourees of an as mere
devices in the service of information or persuasion.
One difference between Adorno and Morawski is of particular interest to
someone considering our general topic ofart and culture today. Adorno thinks
that in our alienated and manipulated age no happy or celebratory an is
possible: any art that is not harsh and difficult must be a means to our seduction
and enslavement, although in happier ages art could be happier too. But,
though Morawski docs not commit himself on this point, there is nothing in
what he says to suggest that the art that is good for our alienated condition is
any different from the art that would be good at other times. Whatever our
condition, art that makes us secure in ourselves, faithful to our origins, and
confident in our futures, must be good for us.
So much for our industrial age ofalienation. What else is special about our
times? Increasingly since the middle of the last century, with the successive
development of mechanical and electronic means ofreproduction and commu-
nication, we have been living in an age of the indiscriminate accessibility of
information, of image overload, of the "museum without walls" whereby the
art ofall ages is accessible by proxy to anyone who wants it, but divorced from
its context, sundered from its setting, and often denatured by being transformed
in scale and turned into the mere content of a photograph.21 As all art has
become, for the first time in history, equally available, all an has become
equally remote, cut off in principle from everyday understanding. Germaine
Bazin has written how about the year 1800 the unprecedented admission of the
public at large into the museums that had hitherto been the preserves of the
initiate already generated the idea that art was something mysterious, remote,
wonderful, cut off from everyday understanding, so that even a local artist
could win acceptance only by pretending that he really belonged somewhere
else, a changeling from fairyland.
In this situation, where all art is at once alien and present, and available in
larger amounL,> and greater diversity than anyone could cope with, we must
each devise strategies for keeping our bearings. The problem is not insoluble.
It is like finding one's way around an unfamiliar department store or cafeteria,
a similarly disorienting experience. At first we are confronted by bewildering
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heaps of stuff, none of which seems quite real. But it doesn't take us long to
develop strategies for finding our way around, for picking out what we want
and ignoring what we don't, until in the end a familiar store becomes a
constellation ofwell-known comers separated by what might as well be oceans
of empty spaces. But my store is not your store: the counter that for me is an
undifferentiated part of the desert between cigars and cameras is for you an
oasis of baLik. The world of art becomes a mosaic of network of intersecting
mini-cultures in which we may devise our own cosmopolitanisms or
irredentisms.
The information explosion ha<; transformed the values we bring to art in
ways that are hard to assess: some aspects of the situation we would like to
welcome, some aspects we would like to resist, but we are often unsure whether
what we would welcome and what we would resist are not the very same things.
It is, on the one hand, splendid that most of us have some sort of access to the
best that has been done: few of us get to Bayreuth, but most of us can listen to
recordings made there. The greatest scholar of the eighteenth century knew
less of Greek sculpture than any undergraduate knows today. How can that not
be good? But, as a consequence, all cellists find themselves compeLing with
Rostropovich, and not with Rostropovich as he plays in the concert hall but
with Rostropovich filtered through microphones and amplifiers designed to
fulfil the listener's daydreams, and the performance thus filtered will have
been selected from several that contained perhaps more nuffs and less
inspiration, and may even have been spliced together out of the best bits from
several performances. How can any human cellist compete? Again, when I go
to a concert by my local symphony orchestra I may hear one work by a living
composer from my own country, but only because without such a work the
Canada Council will withhold its grant; what I will certainly not hear will be
what surely should be the staple fare at such a concert, namely something run
up for the purpose by a home-town composer last week. Of course not. He
would be competing with Beethoven. It is rather as if some process of cloning
enabled the world's fastest sprinter to compete in every ath letic event the world
over. That would be the end of meaningful athletics. And one wonders if our
contemporary universalism and perfectionism does not threaten the end of
meaningful activity in the arts. Most of us who are not professionally con-
cerned with conservatories of music and similar institutions are in constant
danger of forgetting what art really is, of forgetting what we can expect from
ourselves and each other.
Atthe same time, we lose sight of the disLinction between what is universal
and what is local in space and time. Or rather, we forget that what is universal
isalsoofa specific place and Lime, and must be so. We sccand hear the world's
art as if it were the art of Utopia. There is a sense in which local composers do
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nol have lO compelc with Beclhoven, because Beethoven is in no position lo
compelC with thcm. Beelhoven wroldor Vienna and for everywhere, for 1800
and for all lime, bUl he could nol write specifically for Edmonton in 1989. And
if we think lhat nobody could do lhal because lhere is nOlhing special aboul
Edmonton in 1989 lO wrile for,thal may only be because in losing the habil of
making and hearing our own music we have 10Sl a principal means of
recognising ourselves.
No doubl, jusl as Villinyi said we need an arl for comfort as well as an arl
for challenge, so we need an arl that is for evcryone as well as an arllhal is for
ourselves alone. BUl lhis universal arl may nol be thc same as the arl that
everyone talks about. In lhinking aboul art and cullure loday, we mUSl bear in
mind thallOday connOles lhe cphemeral, and lhal is what is here loday is likely
lO be gone tomorrow. Whcn I gCl home al night and my family a"k me whal
happened IOday, what I respond wilh is usually some trivial and amusing
anecdole; the impOrlanllhings lhal happened are thc lhings lhal happen cvery
day, my roulincs of leaching and wriling, and if I am remembercd after I die
il will be for those cveryday things and nol for lhe incidcnts I recall al
supperlime.
So il is with art. The art magazincs and even lhe arl museum give a 10l of
space lo certain modish artists, whosc name everyone in the arl world knows.
Some of them do cxcellent and exciting things, but that is nol why they make
the headlines. They are celcbritics because they are high-profile, what they do
is casily described and recognised. It is for these people thatthc compilers of
exhibition catalogucs and the writcrs of weckly articles make large claims as
to their connection with values today. Specifically, we are told what comment
their work makes on today's civilization, or on the nature of arl, or whatever
it may be. The Bulgarian artist Christo wraps the Chicago Museum of
Contemporary An in tarpaulin; Mark Prent fills a gallery with fibreglass
replicas of corpscs, each with Prent's own face. It's great stuff: breathtaking.
But thcn the prcss agcnts tcll us that Christo is dcnouncing our packaged
society, or revealing the hollowness of the museum world, or something
equally banal, and that Prent is showing us that we are all really dead, or
somcthing equally stupid. I would want to insist on two generalizations, which
obviously I cannot substantiatc, so I merely prescnt thcm as my impressions
which you may share or reject as your knowledge and judgment dictate. First,
the value judgments that such works are said to derive their value from
enshrining are always cliches, slick phrases without any relation to the grain
of anyone's cxpericnce; and sccond, the association between those cliches and
the works said to enshrine them is in every case absurdly loose and superficial,
eithcr depending on a facile analogy with the grossesl a"pects of a work's
general character or elsc rei ying on nothing beyond the critic's personal say-
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so.
The association of high-profile art with high-profile cliches is a mere
public-relations phenomenon. The age of communications engenders within
itself the age of publicity, and our 'today' is certainly that of the PR person, in
which everything is slathered with a slime of self-serving verbiage. And what
lends itself to such practices is what affords talking points, in the way that rock
groups adopt gimmicks of nomenclature and costume to make their music
distinctive.22
If the art that is pressed on us all by mass media and the institutions of the
art market is high-profile art, how is it typically related to values today?
Mostly, it serves a very real purpose: it gives us something to talk to each other
about. Everyone knows about Andy Warhol's Brillo boxes, and if they don't-
we can easily tell them. Such work affords some kind of symbol of public
preoccupations, but beyond that we cannot go. We hear about it and talk about
it, but we are unlikely to have seen it, and it certainly plays no part in the course
of our lives. And a truly prophetic art, expressing and revealing the deepest
values of our time, would attain such publicity only by coincidence. You and
I are unlikely to hear about it, but our grandchildren will have heard about it
I have gone too far, ofcourse. The artists who get most talked about are not
charlatans. Perhaps almost all of them are sincere, dedicated, professionally
expert, brilliant. The people who sell them to us, like most of the most
expensive advertisers, really do have a good product. Nor are the PR people
and catalogue writers fools and liars: they are professionals with a sound
knowledge of sheepishness and goathood. It is just that the evident result of
their labours is a world where obviousness is obvious, and that such a world
is no fit basis for a sensible person's trafficking with the arts.2J
And what more shall we say about today's world? It is in a world in which
we know how we look from the Moon. It is alsoa world in which we don 'tknow
how we look from the Earth. The externals of our lives are subjected to a great
variety of immensely powerful factors of change of all kinds, interacting in
ways no one can predict. Such an age clearly calls for at least three kinds ofart,
as Morawski said. We need the availability of a classical art for the security of
origin, and in the standard repertory we have it. We need a communal art for
the security of solidarity, and in TV network programming and pop music we
have that. And we need a Promethean art for security against future shock, and
in experimental art and anti-art we have that. So we have what we need, and
I think we are pretty lucky.
And where, finally, does all that leave us? It \eaves us, evidently, in a
complicated situation. But, as I said atlhe start, ifart expresses all of life in one
way or another, the complexities of art cannot be radically less than those of
life itself. That should not upset us. Each of us handles the intricacies of our
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own life with great virtuosity. In fact, our nervous systems are set up to deal
with subtle things better than they do with simple things (which is why logic,
the simplest of all subjects, is so difficult).
Here, then, since one must make an end, is a thought to end with. Our
dealing with art may show the same responsible freedom that we exercise in
the conductofourown Iives. The high profile stuff is always there to talk about;
the universal ma<;terpieees are always there to sustain us; and it is only decent
to take a sturdy interest in what isgoing on in the neighborhood. And thcn thcre
is the immense ma<;sofreal art in all its diversity. Obviously noonccould know
it all or would be helped by doing so. Corresponding to this great ma<;s of art
is not one great public, but an interwoven multiplicity of mini-publics,
choosing its favoured artists by propinquity or by a happy discovery ofaffinity.
In fact, it's like marriage. Ideally, one marries one's soul-mate from all the
world's millions; in our dreams, we marry the sexiest or richest or kindest
person not yet spoken for. But in real life we marry the person we happen to
marry, usually from the next street or the same graduating class, and the secret
of happiness is to love the spouse you've got and not worry about the ones that
got away. Or so they tell us. Similarly, the sensible way to deal with the
profusion of the world's art is to ignore it. Find, if you can, one artist whose
work speaks to you; follow that artist's work as it progresses, get to know it in
detail, satumte yourself in its style. If you know one artist's work in that way
you will know art iL<;c1f, and an important way you will know more about art
than if you had trudged through every museum in the world. And I would like
to think, though Isuspect it is not true, that if you really know and love the work
of one artist, then when you do encounter the work of an artist whose work is
not familiar to you, it will greet you with a welcoming smile, as the friend of
a friend.
Notes
The position is developed by Jean Raudrillard, For a Crilique of lhe Polilical
Economy oflhe Sign, lIans. Charles Levin, 5t Louis, 1984. A typically insouciant
expression of the point of view is that of Frederic Jameson: the justification of
linguistic models and metaphors for cullural phenomena 'lit's in the concrete
character of the social life of the so-called advanced counlIies today, which offer
the spectacle of a world from which nature as such has becn climinated.... ' Hc goes
on to refer to 'that systematized and disembodicd nighlInarc which is our culturc
today' (Frederic Jamcson, The Prison-llouse of Language, Princeton, 1972,
pp.viii.ix).
2 An audiencc member, identified as a sociologist, objected that I had omiued the
sensc of the term 'culture' most appropriate to his discipline: culture is that part of
culturc in this second sense that is value-frce and (hencc?) unconscious. I takc itthat
the underlying idea is that what is really shared with all members of a group within
which onc's wholc lifc is lived cannot be an objcct ofchoice and reflection because
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that will include the entire repertoire of one's values and the resulting style ofHfe.
The point is a good one, if one docs not object to saying that cultural values are
value-free. But I do not think it really adds anything to what is said in the texL
3 I have more to say about the relevant ,:onccpt of empire in 'Aesthetics and the End
of Civilization', to appear in Philosophic Exchange in 1994.
4 I have heard it said that the Ontario govcmment will not subsidize dance companies
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Presumably the government thinks that their raison d'etre is not artistic but relates
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acknowledges to be conformable to the principle; when we prove, that the same
principle may be applied to the present case, where he did not perceive nor feel ilS
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he wanLs the delicacy, which is requisite to make him sensible of every beauty and
every blemish, in any composition or discourse' (David Hume, Essays and
Treatises on Several Subjecl.~, London, 1764, vol. I, 1'.263).
12 The language here suggests that this view of art embodies the aggressive and
competitive viewpoint of a male-dominated society, not merely a more refined and
exalted notion of what art is.
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19 Ivan Vitanyi, in an article in the Bontinck collection cited in note 15 above.
20 Stefan Morawski, Inquiries Into the FuruJamentals of Aeslhelics, Cambridge,
1974.
21 The standard exposition of this theme is Walter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the
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Silence. Princeton, 1978.
22 Gennain Hazin. The Museum Age, trans. J. van N. Cahill, New York. 1967. p.160.
23 This public.relations phenomenon is not the same a~ the catastrophe identified by
Arthur Danto. After remarking that the history of twentieth-century art is that of a
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